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S.Ct. 974 31 L.Ed. 795 (Cite
as: 125 U.S. 555, 8 S.Ct. 974) Supreme
Court of the United States BUCHER v. CHESHIRE
R. CO. et al. March
19, 1888. In
Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. This
was an action by Theodore P. Bucher against the Cheshire Railroad Company and
the Fitchburg Railroad Company, to recover damages for personal injuries. Judgment
for the defendants. The plaintiff brings error. West
Headnotes Federal
Courts k428 170Bk428 (Formerly
106k366(23), 106k365(22)) In
an action for personal injuries received by a passenger while traveling on Sunday,
where, on a former trial, in the state court, it had been ruled that plaintiff's
evidence did not show that he was traveling either from necessity or for charity,
and he subsequently took a nonsuit, and brought his action in the United States
circuit court, on the same evidence the circuit court, following the state court,
properly refused to submit the question of necessity or charity to the jury. Federal
Courts k428 170Bk428 (Formerly
106k394(3), 106k372(3), 106k365(22)) In
an action for injuries received by plaintiff while traveling on defendant's railroad
in the state of Massachusetts on the Sabbath, the adjudications of the supreme
court of that state holding that no recovery can be had for injuries received
while traveling on the Sabbath in violation of the Massachusetts statutes, are
binding on the United States supreme court as the local law, though its own views
may not accord with such ruling.
**974 *566 A. A. Ranney, for plaintiff in error.
*576 Chas. A. Welch, for defendants in error. MILLER,
J. This
is a writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the district
of Massachusetts. The plaintiff in error was plaintiff in that court, and sought
to recover of the defendants for injuries which he sustained by reason of their
negligence while traveling upon their roads. The court on the trial substantially
instructed the jury that the *577 plaintiff could not recover because the
injury complained of occurred while he was traveling upon the Sabbath day, in
violation of the law of the state of Massachusetts. A suit between the same parties
in regard to the same transaction had been brought **975 in the supreme
court of that state, in which, on a trial before a jury, the plaintiff obtained
a verdict. This was carried to the court in bank, and was there reversed and sent
back for a new trial. The plaintiff then became nonsuit in the state court and
brought the present action in the circuit court of the United States. It
is important to inquire what was at issue upon the trial in the state court. There
the defendant set up the law of the state found in Gen. St. c. 84, § 2, which
is as follows: 'Whoever travels on the Lord's day, except for necessity or charity,
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten dollars;' and insisted that the
plaintiff, being in the act of violating that law at the time the injury occurred,
could not recover. On the 15th of May, 1877, after the plaintiff was injured,
the legislature of Massachusetts passed a statute declaring that this prohibition
against traveling on the Lord's day should not constitute a defense to an action
against a common carrier of passengers for any tort or injury suffered by the
person so traveling. St. Mass. 1877, c. 232. The supreme court of that state had
decided previous to this, in Stanton v. Railroad Co., 14 Allen,
485, a similar case, that the plaintiff, being engaged in a violation of law,
without which he would not have received the injury sued for, could not obtain
redress in a court of justice. Also, in Bosworth v. Swansey, 10
Metc. 363, and in Jones v. Andover, 10 Allen, 18. In the trial of
the case now under consideration, before the jury in the state court, the plaintiff
does not seem to have controverted the general doctrine thus declared, but insisted
that the present case did not come within the statute, because--First,
the act of May 15, 1877, had declared that traveling on Sunday should no longer
be a defense to actions for injuries suffered by reason of the negligence of carriers
of passengers, although this statute was passed after the accident occurred upon
which the right of action was founded; and *578 second, that at
the time he was injured he was, within the meaning of the statute, traveling upon
an errand of charity or necessity, specially excepted from its provisions. The
court below sustained both of these propositions of the plaintiff, and the court
in bank reversed the trial court upon both of them. It held that the act of May
15, 1877, did not govern a case where the injury had occurred before its passage;
that it was not retroactive; and also held that the facts set out in the bill
of exceptions did not show that the plaintiff was traveling at the time of the
accident either from necessity or for charity. It may be as well to state here
that the facts found in the bill of exceptions relating to this latter question,
as it was presented before the supreme court of Massachusetts, were identical
with those appearing in the bill of exceptions of the case now before us, being
in both cases the plaintiff's own statement of his reasons for traveling on that
day. Upon
the trial in the circuit court of the United States the judge was requested by
the plaintiff to charge the jury that the circumstances detailed in the testimony
of plaintiff and found in the bill of exceptions concerning the illness of his
sister in Minnesota, of which he had received knowledge by letter, and had replied
that he would meet her in Chicago at a certain time, and that, having been delayed
by accidental circumstances, the travel on Sunday, when he was injured, became
necessary to enable him to fulfill that promise, were sufficient to be submitted
to the jury in order that they might pass upon the question of whether or not
this act of traveling on the Lord's day was a work of necessity or charity. This
the court declined to do, saying that the same question having been submitted
to the jury in the trial in the state court, and having been passed upon by the
supreme court of the state, he did not consider that there was evidence sufficient
to go to the jury upon that subject. This is one of the assignments of error now
before us, and upon this point we are of opinion that the court below ruled correctly.
It is not a matter of estoppel which bound the parties in the court below, because
there was no judgment entered in the case in which the ruling of the state court
was *579 made, **976 and we do not place the correctness of the
determination of the circuit court in refusing to permit this question to go to
the jury upon the ground that it was a point decided between the parties, and
therefore res judicata as between them and the present action, but upon
the ground that the supreme court of the state in its decision had given such
a construction to the meaning of the words 'charity' and 'necessity' in the statute
as to clearly show that the evidence offered upon that subject was not sufficient
to prove that the plaintiff was traveling for either of those purposes. The court
in its opinion, which is reported in Bucher v. Railroad co., 131
Mass. 156, said: 'The act of plaintiff in thus traveling on the Lord's day was
not an act of necessity within the meaning of the statute. * * * In order to constitute
an act of charity, such as is exempted from the Lord's day act, the act which
is done must be itself a charitable act. The act of ascertaining whether a charity
is needful is not the charity; but, so far as the statute is concerned, the only
question in that case would be, is this act a necessary act? That involves the
question, whether the act is one which it is necessary to do on the Lord's day;
and no previous neglect to obtain the requisite information on a previous day
creates a necessity for obtaining it on the Lord's day.' After citing other cases
which had been decided in that court, it was further said: 'It is apparent that
the plaintiff's duty to his sister was made subservient to his secular business.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the ruling should have been given that there
was no evidence which would justify the jury in finding that the plaintiff was
traveling from necessity or charity within the meaning of the statute.' Taking,
therefore, this construction of the language of the statute, as well as prior
decisions to the same purport in which we think we are bound to follow the supreme
court of the state, we agree that the record in this case as in that does not
furnish evidence which should have gone to the jury upon that branch of the subject. *580
The other assignment of error, in regard to the effect of traveling on the Lord's
day in violation of the statute of Massachusetts, submitted as a defense to what
would otherwise be a liability of the railroad for the negligence of its servants,
presents the matter in a somewhat different aspect. It is not easy to see that
there was anything in the case as it arose in the circuit court which required
a construction of the meaning of that statute, after eliminating what has just
been suggested as to the signification of the words 'necessity' or 'charity.'
The remainder is a short prohibition against traveling upon the Lord's day, and
provides for the imposition of a penalty for so doing. This is very plain; it
admits of no doubt as to its meaning, and its validity has never been controverted.
When, therefore, the supreme court of Massachusetts, in a long line of decisions,
has held that the violation of this statute may be set up as a defense to a liability
growing out of the negligence of a railroad company in carrying passengers upon
its road, it must have been on some other ground than that to be found in the
expressions used in the statute itself. There is no such provision in it, and
there is no necessary inference to be drawn from its language that it was intended
to control the relations between the passenger and the carrier, or to modify the
obligations of the one to the other. The language of the court in Stanton
v. Railroad Co., already cited, is that 'because the plaintiff was engaged
in the violation of law, without which he would not have received the injury sued
for, he cannot obtain redress in a court of justice.' This principle would seem
to be as applicable to a man engaged in any other transaction forbidden by law
as to that of violating the Sabbath. Whether the doctrine thus laid down is a
sound one, and whether, if it be not sound as it commends itself to our judgment,
we should follow it as being supported by the decisions of the supreme court of
Massachusetts in numerous instances, presents in this case the only serious question
for our consideration. Hamilton v. City of Boston, 14 Allen, 475;
Bosworth v. Swansey, 10 Metc. 363; Jones v. Andover,
10 Allen, **977 18; Day v. *581 Railway Co., 135 Mass.
113; Read v. Railroad Co., 140 Mass. 199, 4 N. E. Rep. 227. If the
proposition, as established by the repeated decisions of the highest court of
that state, were one which we ourselves believed to be a sound one, there would
be no difficulty in agreeing with that court, and, consequently, affirming the
ruling of the circuit judge in the present case. But without entering into the
argument of that subject, we are bound to say that we do not feel satisfied, that
upon any general principles of law by which the courts that have adopted the common-law
system are governed, that this is a true exposition of that law. On the contrary,
in the case of Railroad Co. v. Tow-Boat Co., 23 How. 209, this court
had under consideration the same question. It arose in regard to the effect of
a statute of Maryland forbidding persons 'to work or do any bodily labor, or willingly
suffer any of their servants to do any manner of labor on the Lord's day, works
of charity or necessity excepted,' and prescribing a penalty for a breach thereof.
It was held by this court that where a vessel was prosecuting her voyage on Sunday,
and was injured by piles negligently left in the river, this statute making traveling
on Sunday an offense and punishing it by a penalty, constituted no defense to
an action for damages by the vessel. A number of cases were cited sustaining that
view of the subject, and the court, through Mr. Justice GRIER, used this language:
'We do not feel justified, therefore, on any principles of justice, equity, or
of public policy, in inflicting an additional penalty of seven thousand dollars
on the libelants, by way of set-off, because their servants may have been subject
to a penalty of twenty shillings each for the breach of the statute.' It that
case, however, there had been no decision of the courts of Maryland holding that
a violation of the Sabbath would constitute a defense to the action against the
company which had left the piles in the river. In this view of the matter it is
not unworthy of consideration that, shortly after the injury in the present case
was inflicted, the general court of *582 Massachusetts passed a statute,
to which we have already referred, declaring that traveling on the Lord's day
should not 'constitute a defense to an action against a common carrier of passengers
for any tort or injury suffered by a person so traveling.' The
question then arises, how far is this court bound to follow the decisions of the
Massachusetts supreme court on that subject? The congress of the United States,
in the act by which the federal courts were organized, enacted that 'the laws
of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of
the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.' Rev. St. § 721; Judiciary Act, § 34, 1 U.S.St. at Large, 92.
This statute has been often the subject of construction in this court, and its
opinions have not always been expressed in language that is entirely harmonious.
What are the laws of the several states which are to be regarded 'as rules of
decision in trials at common law,' is a subject which has not been ascertained
and defined with that uniformity and precision desirable in a matter of such great
importance. The language of the statute limits its application to cases of trials
at common law. There is, therefore, nothing in the section which requires it to
be applied to proceedings in equity, or in admiralty; nor is it applicable to
criminal offenses against the United States, (see U. S. v. Reid,
12 How. 361,) or where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States
require other rules of decision. But with these, and some other exceptions which
will be referred to presently, it must be admitted that it does provide that the
laws of the several states shall be received in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply, as the rules of decision in trials at common law. It
has been held by this court that the decisions of the highest court of the state
in regard to the validity or meaning of the constitution of that state, or its
statutes, are to be considered as the law of that state, within the requirement
of *583 this section. **978 In Leffingwell v. Warren,
2 Black, 599, this court said, in regard to the statutes of limitations of a state:
'The construction given to a statute of a state by the highest tribunal of such
state is regarded as a part of the statute, and is as binding upon the courts
of the United States as the text.' In the case of Luther v. Borden,
7 How. 40, Chief Justice TANEY said: 'The point then raised here has been already
decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates altogether to the
constitution and laws of that state; and the well-settled rule in this court is,
that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the state
courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the state.'
See, also, Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667. It is also well settled
that where a course of decisions, whether founded upon statutes or not, have become
rules of property as laid down by the highest courts of the state, by which is
meant those rules governing the descent, transfer, or sale of property, and the
rules which affect the title and possession thereto, they are to be treated as
laws of that state by the federal courts. The principle also applies to the rules
of evidence. In Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 720, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 724, the
court said: 'It has been often decided in this court that in actions at law in
the courts of the United States the rules of evidence and the law of evidence
generally of the state prevail in those courts.' See, also, Wilcox v.
Hunt, 13 Pet. 378; Ryan v. Bindley, 1 Wall. 66. There are undoubtedly
exceptions to the principle that the decisions of the state courts, as to what
are the laws of that state, are in all cases binding upon the federal courts.
The case of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, which has been often followed,
established the principle that if this court took a different view of what the
law was in certain classes of cases which ought to be governed by the general
principles of commercial law, from the state court, it was not bound to follow
the latter. There is, therefore, a large field of jurisprudence left in which
the question of how far the decisions of state courts constitute the law of those
states is an embarrassing one. There is no common law of the United States, and
yet the *584 main body of the rights of the people of this country rest
upon and are governed by principles derived from the common law of England, and
established as the laws of the different states. Each state of the Union may have
its local usages, customs, and common law. Wheaton v Peters, 8 Pet.
591; Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518. When, therefore, in
an ordinary trial in an action at law we speak of the common law we refer to the
law of the state as it has been adopted by statute or recognized by the courts
as the foundation of legal rights. It is in regard to decisions made by the state
courts in reference to this law, and defining what is the law of the state as
modified by the opinions of its own courts, by the statutes of the state, and
the customs and habits of the people, that the trouble arises. It may be said
generally that wherever the decisions of the state courts relate to some law of
a local character, which may have become established by those courts, or has always
been a part of the law of the state, that the decisions upon the subject are usually
conclusive, and always entitled to the highest respect of the federal courts.
The whole of this subject has recently been very ably reviewed in the case of
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10. Where such local
law or custom has been established by repeated decisions of the highest courts
of a state it becomes also the law governing the courts of the United States sitting
in that state. We
are of opinion that the adjudications of the supreme court of Massachusetts, holding
that a person engaged in travel on the Sabbath day, contrary to the statute of
the state, being thus in the act of violating a criminal law of the state, shall
not recover against a corporation upon whose road he travels for the negligence
of its servants, thereby establish this principle as a local law of that state,
declaring, as they do, the effect of its statute in its operation upon the obligation
of the carrier of passengers. The decisions on **979 this subject by the
Massachusetts court are numerous enough and of sufficiently long standing to establish
the rule, so far as they can establish it, and we think that, taken in connection
with the relation which they bear to the statute itself, though giving an effect*
*585 to it which may not meet the approval of this court, they nevertheless
determine the law of Massachusetts on that subject. FIELD
and HARLAN, JJ., dissented. Copr.
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